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Abstract—In this paper we analyze the template protection
method for minutiae-based fingerprint biometrics as proposed
by Yang and Busch (BTAS 2009). This method is based on
a self-aligning and non-invertible parameterized transformation
that is applied to minutiae vicinities. Two attack strategies to
invert protected vicinities are presented and we point out that
the attack complexity is well below the estimates in the original
paper. Improvements to increase the complexity are suggested.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security and privacy issues associated with the increasing
deployment of biometric systems have widely been recognized
and addressed by the scientific community [1] and policy
makers [2]. To deal with these issues several approaches
have been explored to protect biometric data at the template
level. Since traditional encryption schemes cannot deal with
the noise that is inherent to biometrics, new methods have
been invented that are capable of hiding the biometric data,
while at the same preserving the biometric identification and
verification functionality. In addition, these methods introduce
diversification to make protected templates unlinkable and
renewable.
Over the last decade, a vast amount of papers have proposed
schemes to protect biometric templates [3]–[12], and minutiae-
based fingerprint templates in particular [13]–[21]. Many of
the proposed template protection methods can be categorized
as noise-tolerant algorithms. They mostly use error-correcting
codes to compensate for the noise. One of the most popular
techniques is the fuzzy commitment scheme [4], which has
been used for many different types of biometrics [9], [22]. The
application of such schemes is limited since they can only deal
with discrete, i.e., quantized or binary, data. Moreover, they
tend to reveal a substantial amount of biometric data [23].
Another category of methods deals with continuous-source
biometrics and compensates for the noise during quantiza-
tion [7]. Despite the good properties they possess, most fuzzy
schemes suffer from the limitation that their inputs have to
be of fixed length, which is not the case for a minutiae vector
extracted from a fingerprint. Several attempts have been made,
though, to overcome this problem [14], [24], [25].
In 2001 Ratha et al. [5] introduced the concept of cancelable
biometrics. Although the cancelability referred mainly to the
fact that a protected template can be revoked and renewed,
without being linkable, the term is now commonly associated
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with a protection method that applies a non-invertible, param-
eterized transformation in the signal or feature domain. The
benefits of this approach are that the non-invertible transforma-
tion can be combined with existing (unprotected) comparison
algorithms and that they suffer less from the performance
degradation that is typically observed when template protec-
tion is introduced. Moreover, cancelable biometrics can deal
with more input types. Global transformations for fingerprint
biometrics have been proposed by Ratha et al. [20]. However,
the linkability and non-invertibility of their transformations
have recently been challenged [26].
One of the drawbacks of a global transformation is that the
templates need to be pre-aligned. To overcome this problem,
Yang and Busch [21] have presented a new method for
self-alignment and protection of fingerprint templates. Each
template is decomposed in a set of minutiae vicinities. To
each of these vicinities the self-alignment and a non-invertible
transformation are applied. Comparison of two protected tem-
plates is done vicinity-wise. The main objective of this work
is to analyze the security of the method proposed by Yang and
Busch. We will evaluate the vicinity transformation and revise
its security analysis. Two attack strategies are elaborated and
we will show that it is possible to reverse protected minutiae
vicinities at a high level of accuracy.
The paper is organized as follows. The main concepts of
cancelable biometrics for minutiae-based fingerprint templates
are introduced in Section II, along with some notation, and we
show how these concepts are used in the scheme proposed by
Yang and Busch [21]. After the analysis of the scheme, two
attack strategies are described and evaluated in Section III.
We discuss the results and evaluate how the properties of
the scheme lead to the reversibility of protected minutiae
vicinities. Section IV concludes this paper.
II. CANCELABLE MINUTIAE TEMPLATES
For the purpose of this paper we will briefly reiterate the
main concepts of cancelable biometrics and introduce some
notation for fingerprint minutiae templates that is needed for
the rest of this paper. We will follow to a large extent the
notation presented in [21].
A. Minutiae Vicinities
A fingerprint minutiae template T is defined as a set of
points mi, the minutiae, which are represented as triplets
indicating their coordinates and orientation in the fingerprint:
T = {mi}i=1..N = {(xi, yi, θi)}i=1..N .
Alternatively, the minutiae template can be represented as a
set of minutiae vicinities. A minutiae vicinity is defined as a
set of (M +1) minutia points, i.e., a minutia point mi and its
M closest neighbors cij :
T V = {Vi}i=1..N = { {mi, cij}j=1..M }i=1..N .
B. Cancelable Biometrics
The idea of a cancelable biometrics algorithm as proposed
by Ratha et al. [5] is to apply a non-invertible (keyed)
transformation F in the signal or feature domain in such a way
that comparison algorithms that exist for unprotected templates
can also be used to compare protected templates. In the context
of fingerprint recognition, a minutia matcher for unprotected
templates T and T ′ can be used to compare the protected
variants TP = F (T ) and T ′P = F (T ′). The protected template
is again a set of minutiae points, i.e.,
TP = {m
′
i}i=1..K
and K and N are not necessarily equal. When we consider
vicinities we will assume that each vicinity is protected
individually:
T VP = {Vi,P }i=1..N = {F (Vi)}i=1..N .
Similarly the number of minutiae in Vi does not have to be
the same as the number of minutiae in Vi,P .
Often the transformation depends on a secret key K . To
make it explicit we write TP = F (T,K). The key can, in
theory, be the same for all users but will most likely be
different due to re-enrollments. In addition to an extra level
of security, the key provides a way to diversify the templates.
The security properties of a cancelable fingerprint trans-
formation F were specified in [20] in terms of a matching
algorithm. For example, two templates that are produced with a
different transformation are unlinkable if they are not classified
as related by the matching algorithm. The property of main
interest for this paper is the irreversibility, which states that a
template T should not be recoverable from its protected variant
TP = F (T ), i.e., the inverse of F must not exist. Assuming
that a key is used to perform the transformation we distinguish
between the following two forms of irreversibility1.
• A transformation F provides weak irreversibility if for
any adversary who knows the transformation F it is
infeasible to recover T from TP = F (T,K).
• A transformation F provides strong irreversibility if for
any adversary who knows the transformation F and the
key K it is infeasible to recover T from TP = F (T,K).
C. Minutiae Vicinity Method
At BTAS 2009 a method for protecting fingerprint templates
based on minutiae vicinities was proposed by Yang and
Busch [21]. A minutiae template T is transformed into a
vicinity template T V and alignment and protection are applied
to each vicinity individually. The self-alignment avoids the
1We opt for this terminology, in analogy of the weak and strong biometric
privacy requirements for key generation as defined by Ballard et al. [27].
unreliable pre-alignment of the full minutiae template based
on core points. The method is explained in this section.
1) Self-Alignment: Recall that a vicinity consists of a
leading minutia mi and its M closest neighbors cij . In each
vicinity L orientations are chosen, along which the vicinity
will be aligned (e.g. Fig. 1). An orientation is defined by an
orientation vector, i.e., an ordered pair of minutiae, e.g.,−−−→mici1.
The vicinity is translated and rotated in such a way that the
direction of the vector −−−→mici1 is used as the new x-axis and the
middle point as the new origin. The result of the alignment
is shown in Fig. 2 (the aligned vicinity consists of the points
m′i, c
′
i1, c
′
i2 and c′i3).
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Fig. 1. Orientations O1 to O5 in vicinity Vi = {mi, ci1, ci2, ci3} [21].
For L orientations, there are L aligned groups and (M−1)
points per group, i.e., not including the points that determine
the orientation. Only L of the 2
(
M+1
2
)
possible orientations
are used in order to reduce the template size. In this paper
it is assumed that an attacker knows how the orientations
are chosen, e.g., the algorithm may choose the L longest
orientation vectors. This is a reasonable assumption as the
security of the algorithm should not depend on some obscure
techniques. In the original paper M = 3 and L = 5.
2) Offsetting: The protection is based on a parameterized
offsetting of the minutiae in the self-aligned vicinity. The
minutia points that defined the new x-axis are ignored. Offsets
are added to the coordinates of the self-aligned minutiae in po-
lar direction and their corresponding perpendicular direction,
as illustrated in Fig. 2.
For each J ′j in the self-aligned vicinity that did not deter-
mine the orientation vector the coordinates are offset as{
Jaj(x) = J
′
j(x) + ∆xl · cos(ϕ) + ∆yl · cos(ϕ +
pi
2
)
Jaj(y) = J
′
j(y) + ∆xl · sin(ϕ) + ∆yl · sin(ϕ+
pi
2
)
(1)
where the polar direction ϕ is defined by the aligned minutia
direction
ϕ = tan−1
(
J
′
j(y)
J
′
j(x)
)
. (2)
The offsets ∆xl and ∆yl are different for each orientation and
are calculated as{
∆xl = Dl · dxl +Dmax · sign(dxl)
∆yl = Dl · dyl +Dmax · sign(dyl)
. (3)
The parameters dxl and dyl are randomly generated during
enrollment and stored in a key table K , which contains L
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Fig. 2. Self-aligned and offset vicinity after alignment along O1 = −−−→mici1 .
The minutiae that determined the orientation vector are ignored while the
remaining self-aligned minutiae c′i1 and c′i2 are offset to Ja1 and Ja2 [21].
entries, one for each orientation. The values of dx and dy
are in the range [−1, 1]. The parameter Dl is the length
of the orientation vector that was used for the alignment
along orientation Ol and Dmax = max{Dl : l = 1..L} is
the length of the longest of the L orientation vectors that
are used for alignment. The L groups of self-aligned and
offset points are then superimposed. The result is the full
protected vicinity, which contains L∗(M−1) protected minutia
points. Comparison of protected templates is done on a vicinity
basis. The final mathcing score is computed as the number of
matching vicinities.
3) Attack Complexity: The security analysis in [21] esti-
mates that the complexity of inverting a protected template
by guessing ten of the original minutiae is approximately
285, i.e., the number of possible combinations of ten points
given the size of the template and a minimum distance
(the ridge width) between any pair of minutiae. Due to the
vicinity approach, however, the complexity is reduced to the
complexity of inverting protected vicinities. The complexity of
a brute-force attack on a vicinity by guessing the location of
the M neighboring minutiae depends on the dynamic range
Ro of the coordinates in the original (unprotected) vicinity.
The range Ro from the leading minutia to its neighbors is
estimated to be at most 200. For a ridge width WR = 10 and
M = 3, the complexity is estimated at
(
bpiR2
o
/W 2
R
c
M
)
≈ 228 .
This complexity is considerably low, but it is assumed that
the attacker knows the key, i.e., the random offset table, or
has access to some functionality that allows him to regenerate
a protected vicinity on input of a guessed vicinity.
The complexity of an inversion attack based on the protec-
tion algorithm and the information in the protected template
was estimated at 267 given that the attacker knows the key.
Without the key, the complexity is estimated at 2120. In the
next section, we will demonstrate that the complexity can be
reduced to 217 for an attacker who knows the key. Assuming
that the attacker does not know the key is a strong and
unrealistic assumption, since anyone, e.g., an insider, can be
an attacker.
III. ATTACKS
In this section we will present two attack strategies that
challenge the strong irreversibility of the scheme proposed in
[21]. The protected template is the aggregate of N protected
vicinities and thus the goal in each strategy is to invert a
protected minutiae vicinity. Our attack model assumes that the
adversary knows the transformation function, how to choose
the orientations and which entry in the key table (random
offsets) is used for which orientation.
From now on we will refer to the original vicinity in self-
aligned form. Each original vicinity consists of (M + 1)
points, which are consequently transformed to a set of L
superimposed sets of (M −1) points. Given the parameters
in [21], an original vicinity consists of four minutia points
whereas the protected vicinities contain ten points. If a correct
pair is chosen in the protected vicinity and if the corresponding
offsets are known, then this pair can be shifted back to
its original (self-aligned) position. Because the points that
determine the orientation vector are located on the x-axis and
symmetrically around the origin, these can be recovered as
well if the length of the orientation vector is known. The
problem of inverting the protected vicinity thus boils down
to finding the offsets and the length of the orientation vector.
Recall from (1) that the offsets ∆xl and ∆yl are given by{
∆xl = Dl · dxl +Dmax · sign(dxl)
∆yl = Dl · dyl +Dmax · sign(dyl)
.
Finding these offsets, given the key (dxl, dyl), is equivalent
to finding Dl, the length of the current orientation vector, and
Dmax, the length of the longest orientation vector. The value
of Dl also reveals the aligned coordinates of the minutiae that
defined the orientation vector, i.e., (−Dl/2, 0) and (Dl/2, 0).
A. Maximum Orientation Length (Dmax) Attack
1) Attack Strategy: In the alignment and offsetting along
the longest orientation vector, we have that Dl = Dmax . The
offsets can be written as{
∆xl = Dmax · sign(dxl) · (1 + |dxl|)
∆yl = Dmax · sign(dyl) · (1 + |dyl|)
(4)
and the ratio between ∆xl and ∆yl is
∆xl
∆yl
=
sign(dxl) · (1 + |dxl|)
sign(dyl) · (1 + |dyl|)
. (5)
Guessing the offsets is reduced to guessing the value of
Dmax . Given the correct subset of (M − 1) points in the
protected vicinity and the key (dxl, dyl), the attack strategy is
to iterate over the range of Dmax and to compute the offsets
∆xl and ∆yl in each iteration. The potential original vicinity
is reconstructed by inverting the offsets and by positioning the
minutiae of the orientation vector on the x-axis. To validate
the guess of Dmax, the protected vicinity is regenerated from
the guessed original vicinity and compared with the given
protected vicinity. A simple distance error function is used
to validate the guess.
Unfortunately, the subset of (M − 1) protected minutiae
and the key (dxl, dyl) corresponding to the longest orientation
vector are not known. Moreover, there is only one orientation,
and thus only one entry in the key table, for which it holds
that Dl = Dmax. Therefore, we will exhaustively search over
all possible subsets of size (M−1) in the protected vicinity
and over all key entries. From the combination (minutiae pair,
key entry) that yields the smallest distance error, the original
vicinity will be recovered. Given the parameters in [21]
(M = 3, L = 5 and Dmax ∈ [0, 2 ∗ Ro] for Ro < 200)
the worst-case complexity of the attack is(
L ∗ (M−1)
M−1
)
· L · 2 ∗Ro =
(
10
2
)
· 5 · 400 ≈ 217 . (6)
2) Attack Algorithm: For practical reasons, we guess the
phase difference θ between the minutia points before and
after the offset, instead of guessing Dmax or ∆xl directly.
The phase iterates from −pi/2 to pi/2 for a given resolution
θres, i.e., the phase estimate is increased with (pi/2)/θres in.
each iteration. It is possible that a guess yields an impossible
result, e.g., if after reversing the offsets the recovered minutiae
fall on the opposite side of the original protected minutiae.
A detailed description of the attack algorithm is given in
Appendix (Algorithm 1).
3) Experimental Results: To simulate the attack algorithm a
vicinity V of four minutia positions is randomly generated on
a frame of 200×200 pixels. From V a protected vicinity VP is
generated on which the Dmax attack algorithm is run. Step 2
of the algorithm, i.e., the search for the best θ given a minutiae
pair (mi,mj) and key entry (dxl, dyl) is shown in Fig. 3(a).
For point mi, all possible pre-offset positions m′i form an
elliptic trajectory that passes through mi. The trajectory for
mj is incomplete because some (∆xl,∆yl) move mj to the
invalid region. If the minutiae pair that was selected in VP is
correct for the given key entry, then the two trajectories will
pass closely to the two pre-offset minutiae that were aligned
along the Dmax orientation.
The search is performed over all pairs in VP and for all key
entries in K . The best guess has a protected vicinity that is
closest to the given vicinity. The distance errors for the best
offset guesses, based on a resolution θres = 30, for all pairs
and all key entries are shown in Fig. 4. The smallest error
appears on pair 29 (4th and 9th minutia in VP ) with key entry
4 which is indeed the target combination in our simulation.
The final result of the attack is shown in Fig. 3(b).
Obviously, the result will better approximate the target
vicinity if the search (phase) resolution is increased, which
will also increase the search time. However, Table I suggests
that already for a low resolution the correct key and minutiae
pair can be identified. The depth of the resolution that yields a
correct result is expected to depend on the target vicinity. As
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
 
 
key 1
key 2
key 3
key 4
key 5
Fig. 4. The best distance error between the protected vicinity VP and the
regenerated vicinity V ′P for all 45 minutiae pairs and all 5 key entries. The
phase resolution is θres = 30. Combinations of pairs and key entries that are
considered impossible have no distance error.
the phase estimate iterates from −pi/2 to pi/2 in (2∗θres+1)
steps, the complexity of the attack as given by (6) can be
rewritten in term of the applied resolution(
L ∗ (M−1)
M−1
)
· L · (2 ∗ θres + 1) . (7)
The best result in our table has a complexity of 45 · 5 · (2 ·
720 + 1) ≈ 218, which is way below an acceptable security
level. The attack significantly improves the brute-force attack
at the vicinity level and its running time is in the order of
minutes. We note, however, that the lower resolutions, which
run in seconds, correctly identify the pairs and the associated
key entries. An adaptive algorithm that starts with a low
resolution and maintains a list of candidate (minutiae pair, key
entry) combinations could then adapt its resolution on focused
regions to further reduce the complexity.
TABLE I
MINIMUM DISTANCE ERROR VERSUS PHASE RESOLUTION θres .
θres emin Key Pair Complexity
30 158.2159 4 (4,9) 214
60 94.7099 4 (4,9) 215
90 42.0663 4 (4,9) 215
180 42.0663 4 (4,9) 216
360 42.0663 4 (4,9) 217
720 28.2448 4 (4,9) 218
B. Arbitrary Orientation (Dl) Attack
1) Attack Strategy: The Dmax attack exploits the op-
portunity to reduce the number of variables in the offset
equations (1) when Dmax is equal to Dl. While this reduces
the complexity of the problem, it can easily be avoided by
modifying the way the offsets are generated, e.g., by removing
the Dmax term or by using other orientations. We demonstrate
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(a) Guessing trajectory of the Dmax attack for a given pair (mi,mj)
and key entry (dxl, dyl). The red squares represent the protected
minutiae in VP . The red circles are the minutiae in V aligned along
the longest orientation, before offsetting. The blue and magenta crosses
show the trajectory of the recovered minutiae m′i and m′j , respectively,
for the different guesses of θ. The phase resolution is θres = 30. Invalid
guesses are removed.
−300 −200 −100 0 100 200 300 400
−300
−250
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
150
(b) Result of the Dmax attack with phase resolution θres = 90.
The chart includes the protected minutiae in VP (red squares), the
regenerated protected vicinity V ′
P
(blue plusses) for the best guess of
θ, the original vicinity (red circles) and the cracked vicinity recovered
with the Dmax algorithm (blue crosses).
Fig. 3. Visualization of the maximum orientation length (Dmax) attack.
in this section that we can equally well attack any other
orientation Ol by iterating over all possible combinations of
∆xl and ∆yl.
Instead of testing all key entries we take one since any of
the entries will have a minutiae pair corresponding to it. Our
approach is similar to the Dmax attack. For a selected key
entry we try all minutiae pairs in the protected vicinity and
we exhaustively search the offsets ∆xl and ∆yl. Similarly
as in the previous attack, we will set a search resolution and
solve (1). Guesses are immediately eliminated if
• Dl or Dmax is negative;
• Dl is larger than Dmax;
• Dmax is not the length of the longest orientation in the
recovered vicinity V ′.
Each recovered vicinity V ′ is used to regenerate a protected
vicinity V ′P , which is then compared with the given VP . A
distance error is computed and the guessed vicinity with the
smallest error will indicate the pair that is associated with the
selected key entry.
2) Algorithm: We do not guess ∆yl directly. As in the
previous attack, we use the phase change after the offset. The
resolution for this parameter is θres, the (distance) resolution
for ∆xl is denoted by xres. The range of the offset is limited
by the boundaries of the template space. Let xmax denote the
maximum distance from the origin. Hence, our guess for ∆xl
goes from −xmax to xmax with step xres. The worst-case
complexity of the attack is(
L ∗ (M−1)
M−1
)
· (2 ∗ θres + 1) ·
(⌊
2 ∗ xmax
xres
⌋
+ 1
)
(8)
The details of the attack algorithm are given in Appendix
(Algorithm 2).
3) Experimental Result: The simulation is the same as in
Section III-A3. A vicinity VP is generated on which the Dl
attack algorithm is run. Step 2 of the algorithm, i.e., the
search for the best θ and ∆x˜l given a minutiae pair (mi,mj)
and an arbitrarily selected key entry (dxa, dya) is shown in
Fig. 5(a). As opposed to the Dmax attack, the potential pre-
offset positions m′i,m′j do not lie on a single curve. Instead
bands are formed because of the additional variable ∆x˜l that
has to be estimated. If the minutiae pair that was selected in VP
is correct for the selected key entry, then the two trajectories
will approximate the two pre-offset minutiae that were aligned
along the Dl orientation. The cracked vicinity produced by the
Dl attack is shown in Fig. 5(b).
Similar conclusions as for the Dmax attack can be drawn for
this attack. Table II presents the minimum distance error for
given key entries and different values of the phase resolution
and the distance resolution. Results that are incorrect, i.e.,
when the Dl attack associates the wrong minutiae pair with the
given key entry, are denoted by /. The best (and completely
correct) result is achieved with resolutions θres = 90 and
xres = 1 . If we approximate 2 ∗ xmax in (8) with the height
H = 560 of the template, the Dl attack has a worst-case
complexity 45 · (2 · 90 + 1) · (560 + 1) ≈ 222 for the given
resolutions.
Table II suggests that a minimum search resolution is
required to get a correct result for a given key entry. However,
whereas the Dmax attack can match only one (unknown) key
entry and minutiae pair, the Dl attack can be run against
any given key entry individually. Individual runs at lower
resolutions can be validated by looking at all runs as a whole
to achieve a stronger result.
C. Full Fingerprint Example
To show the applicability of the algorithms, the Dl
and Dmax attacks are applied on a sample from the
FVC2000_DB4_B fingerprint database (Fig. 6(a)). In the
−300 −200 −100 0 100 200 300 400
−300
−250
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
150
mi
mj
∆yl
∆xl
θ
(a) Guessing trajectory of the Dl attack for a given pair (mi, mj) and
arbitrarily selected key entry (dxa, dya). Protected minutiae in VP are
represented by the red squares. The red circles are the target vicinity
aligned along orientation Ol, before offsetting. The guessed minutiae
m′i and m′j are given by the blue and magenta crosses for the different
guesses of θ and ∆x˜l) . The phase resolution is θres = 30 and the
∆xl resolution is xres = 4. Invalid guesses are removed.
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(b) Result of the Dl attack with phase resolution θres = 90 and ∆xl
resolution xres = 2. Red squares represent the protected minutiae in
VP , blue plusses are the regenerated protected vicinity V ′P , red circles
are the target vicinity and blue crosses are the cracked vicinity recovered
with the Dl algorithm.
Fig. 5. Visualization of the arbitrary orientation (Dl) attack.
TABLE II
MINIMUM DISTANCE ERROR VERSUS PHASE AND ∆x˜ RESOLUTION FOR
DIFFERENT KEY ENTRIES. INCORRECT RESULTS ARE DENOTED BY /.
θres xres key 1 key 2 key 3 key 4 key 5
30 4 / 687.0415 / / 150.3345
30 2 / 235.5736 / / 130.4024
30 1 / 224.3830 / 175.1013 130.4024
60 4 129.8887 143.3 / / 115.2934
60 2 74.9108 143.2895 / / 115.2934
60 1 57.6379 114.4178 / 121.0662 115.2934
90 4 112.0742 275.2957 / 56.6330 64.7344
90 2 26.7149 63.8929 46.8822 56.6330 64.7344
90 1 26.7149 63.8929 46.8822 56.6330 61.0708
sample fingerprint, 15 high quality minutiae are selected and
used to generate 15 protected vicinities each with a random
key table. The Dl and Dmax attacks are applied to each
protected vicinity and the resolutions are set to θres = 60
for both attacks and to xres = 1 for the Dl attack. The
Dmax attack has a lower complexity, whereas the Dl attack
provides more flexibility or verification capabilities. There is,
however, no significant difference in performance (in terms of
emin) between the two attack strategies. Given the key and the
protected vicinities, the original vicinities can be inverted one
by one. We note that by comparing the topological similarities
between the reconstructed vicinities it is possible to gradually
consolidate the original, non-vicinity based, minutiae template.
D. Increasing the Search Complexity
One of the main weak points in the attacked algorithm is
that the offsets ∆xl and ∆yl depend on only a few variables. In
combination with the vicinity approach this yields a relatively
small search space for an attacker. A second weakness lies
in the amount of information that is reused. The number
of orientations that are used, the number of minutiae in a
vicinity and the fact that some minutiae are offset more than
once, give an attacker the means to verify the offsets that he
estimates. This is most certainly the case for the orientation
with maximum length (Dl = Dmax).
A first improvement would be to no longer use the max-
imum length orientation for alignment. Secondly, the offset
equations (1) should be modified to include more inherent
biometric information and to introduce more non-linearity in
the offsets. To make it further unsolvable, the offsets should be
different for every aligned minutia and not be used for a pair
of minutiae as is now the case. With these modifications, the
search complexity should be increased to the level of a brute-
force attack. However, despite the improvements the limited
number of minutiae and the small template dimensions will
remain a fundamental problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analyzed the scheme of Yang and
Busch for protecting fingerprint minutiae templates. Two al-
gorithms were presented to attack and successfully reverse the
protected templates. The attacks break the strong irreversibility
of the method. This means that an attacker knows the key table
K , which makes sense because it will probably be stored along
with the protected templates. To break the weak irreversibility
an attacker would have to guess the key table in the same
way as the other variables were guessed in our attacks. The
results seem to suggest that this might require significantly
more efforts. What has to be analyzed is whether or not a
unique solution still exists if the key has to be guessed as
well.
Although this paper addresses one particular method which
is focused on minutiae-based fingerprint templates, many of
the ideas could potentially be applied to other types of cance-
lable biometrics algorithms that feature geometrical transfor-
mations. Because attack complexities are often overestimated,
security criteria and evaluation methods for biometric template
protection need to be further developed. We leave this and the
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(b) The red squares represent the emin for the Dmax attack and the blue diamonds
represent the emin of the Dl attack, minimized over all key entries.
Fig. 6. Full fingerprint example: the Dl and Dmax attack applied on a protected fingerprint consisting of 15 minutiae vicinities.
extension of the presented attacks to other schemes for our
future work.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Prabhakar, S. Pankanti, and A. K. Jain, “Biometric recognition:
Security and privacy concerns,” IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 1, no. 2,
pp. 33–42, March-April 2003.
[2] A. Cavoukian and A. Stoianov. (March 2007) Biometric encryption:
A positive-sum technology that achieves strong authentication, security
AND privacy. [Online]. Available: http://www.ipc.on.ca/
[3] G. Davida, Y. Frankel, and B. Matt, “On enabling secure applications
through off-line biometric identification,” Proc. of the IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy – S&P ’98, pp. 148–157, May 1998.
[4] A. Juels and M. Wattenberg, “A fuzzy commitment scheme,” in CCS
’99: Proc. of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and Communications
Security, 1999, pp. 28–36.
[5] N. K. Ratha, J. H. Connell, and R. M. Bolle, “Enhancing security
and privacy in biometrics-based authentication systems,” IBM Systems
Journal, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 614–634, 2001.
[6] A. Juels and M. Sudan, “A fuzzy vault scheme,” in Proc. of IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory, Lausanne, Switzerland,
A. Lapidoth and E. Teletar, Eds. IEEE Press, 2002, p. 408.
[7] J.-P. M. G. Linnartz and P. Tuyls, “New shielding functions to enhance
privacy and prevent misuse of biometric templates,” in AVBPA, ser.
LNCS, J. Kittler and M. S. Nixon, Eds., vol. 2688. Springer, 2003, pp.
393–402.
[8] Y. Dodis, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith, “Fuzzy extractors: How to generate
strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data,” in Advances in Cryp-
tology - EUROCRYPT 2004, ser. LNCS, C. Cachin and J. Camenisch,
Eds., vol. 3027. Springer, 2004, pp. 523–540.
[9] P. Tuyls, A. H. M. Akkermans, T. A. M. Kevenaar, G. J. Schrijen, A. M.
Bazen, and R. N. J. Veldhuis, “Practical biometric authentication with
template protection,” in AVBPA, ser. LNCS, T. Kanade, A. K. Jain, and
N. K. Ratha, Eds., vol. 3546. Springer, 2005, pp. 436–446.
[10] J. Bringer, H. Chabanne, G. Cohen, B. Kindarji, and G. Zémor, “Optimal
iris fuzzy sketches,” First IEEE International Conference on Biometrics:
Theory, Applications, and Systems, 2007. BTAS 2007., pp. 1–6, 27–29
September 2007.
[11] A. Beng Jin Teoh and C. T. Yuang, “Cancelable biometrics realization
with multispace random projections,” IEEE Transactions on Systems,
Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics, vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 1096–
1106, 2007.
[12] J. Bringer, H. Chabanne, and B. Kindarji, “The best of both worlds:
Applying secure sketches to cancelable biometrics,” Science of Com-
puter Programming, vol. 74, no. 1-2, pp. 43–51, 2008, special Issue on
Security and Trust.
[13] R. Ang, R. Safavi-Naini, and L. McAven, “Cancelable key-based fin-
gerprint templates,” in ACISP, ser. LNCS, C. Boyd and J. M. G. Nieto,
Eds., vol. 3574. Springer, 2005, pp. 242–252.
[14] U. Uludag, S. Pankanti, and A. K. Jain, “Fuzzy vault for fingerprints,”
in AVBPA, ser. LNCS, T. Kanade, A. K. Jain, and N. K. Ratha, Eds.,
vol. 3546. Springer, 2005, pp. 310–319.
[15] A. Arakala, J. Jeffers, and K. J. Horadam, “Fuzzy extractors for
minutiae-based fingerprint authentication,” in ICB 2007, ser. LNCS, S.-
W. Lee and S. Z. Li, Eds., vol. 4642. Springer, 2007, pp. 760–769.
[16] T. Boult, W. Scheirer, and R. Woodworth, “Revocable fingerprint
biotokens: Accuracy and security analysis,” in IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2007. CVPR ’07., IEEE.
IEEE Computer Society, June 2007, pp. 1–8.
[17] E.-C. Chang and S. Roy, “Robust extraction of secret bits from minu-
tiae,” in ICB 2007, ser. LNCS, S.-W. Lee and S. Z. Li, Eds., vol. 4642.
Springer, 2007, pp. 750–759.
[18] S. Draper, A. Khisti, E. Martinian, A. Vetro, and J. Yedidia, “Using
distributed source coding to secure fingerprint biometrics,” Acoustics,
Speech and Signal Processing, 2007. ICASSP 2007. IEEE International
Conference on, vol. 2, pp. II–129–II–132, 15-20 April 2007.
[19] C. Lee, J.-Y. Choi, K.-A. Toh, and S. Lee, “Alignment-free cancelable
fingerprint templates based on local minutiae information,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics, vol. 37,
no. 4, pp. 980–992, August 2007.
[20] N. K. Ratha, S. Chikkerur, J. H. Connell, and R. M. Bolle, “Generating
cancelable fingerprint templates,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis
and Machine Intelligence, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 561–572, 2007.
[21] B. Yang and C. Busch, “Parameterized geometric alignment for
minutiae-based fingerprint template protection,” in IEEE 3rd Interna-
tional Conference on Biometrics: Theory, Applications, and Systems,
2009, BTAS ’09, 28–30 September 2009, pp. 1–6.
[22] F. Hao, R. Anderson, and J. Daugman, “Combining crypto with biomet-
rics effectively,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 55, no. 9, pp.
1081–1088, 2006.
[23] K. Simoens, P. Tuyls, and B. Preneel, “Privacy weaknesses in biometric
sketches,” in 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May
2009, pp. 188–203.
[24] A. Nagar, K. Nandakumar, and A. K. Jain, “Securing fingerprint
template: Fuzzy vault with minutiae descriptors,” in Proc. International
Conf. on Pattern Recognition (ICPR). IEEE, 2008, pp. 1–4.
[25] H. Xu, R. N. J. Veldhuis, A. M. Bazen, T. A. M. Kevenaar, T. A. H. M.
Akkermans, and B. Gokberk, “Fingerprint verification using spectral
minutiae representations,” Transaction on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 397–409, 2009.
[26] A. Nagar, K. Nandakumar, and A. K. Jain, “Biometric template trans-
formation: a security analysis,” Media Forensics and Security II, vol.
7541, no. 1, p. 75410O, 2010.
[27] L. Ballard, S. Kamara, and M. K. Reiter, “The practical subtleties of
biometric key generation,” in Proc. of the 17th Annual USENIX Security
Symposium, 2008, pp. 61–74.
[28] T. Kanade, A. K. Jain, and N. K. Ratha, Eds., Audio- and Video-Based
Biometric Person Authentication, 5th International Conference, AVBPA
2005, Hilton Rye Town, NY, USA, July 20-22, 2005, Proceedings, ser.
LNCS, vol. 3546. Springer, 2005.
[29] S.-W. Lee and S. Z. Li, Eds., Advances in Biometrics, International
Conference, ICB 2007, Seoul, Korea, August 27-29, 2007, Proceedings,
ser. LNCS, vol. 4642. Springer, 2007.
APPENDIX
ATTACK ALGORITHMS
Algorithm 1: Dmax attack for M = 3
Input: Protected vicinity VP = {mi}i=1..2∗L
Key table K = {(dxl, dyl)}l=1..L
Phase resolution θres
Output: Vicinity V = {m′i}i=1..4
1. Iterate over all pairs in VP and all key entries in K;
foreach Pair (mi,mj) in VP do
foreach Key entry (dxl, dyl) in K do
Calculate the best guess for θ using step 2;
end
end
2. Find the best θ given (mi,mj) and (dxl, dyl);
Let emin =∞ and θmin = 0;
for θ = −pi/2 to pi/2, step with (pi/2)/θres do
Let ∆y˜l ← |mi| · sin(θ);
Compute ∆x˜l from ∆y˜l and (5);
Reverse translate (mi,mj) to (m′i,m′j);
// Check validity of m′i and m′j
if invalid guess then
Increase θ and skip rest of loop
end
Calculate Dl using (4);
Let m′x1 ← (−Dl/2, 0) and m′x2 ← (Dl/2, 0);
Regenerate V ′P from {m′i,m′j ,m′x1,m′x2};
// Calculate similarity VP and VP ′
foreach m′i in V ′P do
Find closest mi in VP ;
Calculate distance di = d(mi,m′i);
Remove mi and m′i from VP and V ′P ,
respectively;
end
// Update best guess
if
∑
di < emin then
Let emin =
∑
di and θmin = θ
end
end
3. Create performance list L with entries
{(mi,mj), (dxl, dyl), emin, θmin}. Each entry indicates
the best distance error which is obtained for the given
minutiae pair and key entry by by using the estimate θ;
4. Select entry in L with smallest emin to recover
unprotected vicinity V ;
Return: V
Algorithm 2: Dl attack for M = 3
Input: Protected vicinity VP = {mi}i=1..2∗L
Key table K = {(dxl, dyl)}l=1..L
Phase resolution θres and distance resolution xres
Output: Vicinity V = {m′i}i=1..4
1. Select an arbitrary key entry (dxa, dya) from K ;
foreach Pair (mi,mj) in VP do
Calculate the best guess for θ and ∆x˜l using step 2;
end
2. Find the best θ and ∆x˜l given (mi,mj) and
(dxa, dya);
for θ = −pi/2 to pi/2, step with (pi/2)/θres) do
for ∆x˜l = −xmax to xmax, step with xres do
Let ∆y˜l ← |mi| · sin(θ);
Compute Dl and Dmax from ∆y˜l, ∆x˜l, key
entry (dxa, dya) and (5);
// Check validity Dl and Dmax
if Dl < 0 or Dmax ≤ 0 or Dmax < Dl then
Increase ∆x˜l and skip rest of loop;
end
Reverse translate (mi,mj) to (m′i,m′j);
// Check validity of m′i and m′j
if invalid guess then
Increase ∆x˜l and skip rest of loop;
end
Let m′x1 ← (−Dl/2, 0) and m′x2 ← (Dl/2, 0);
// Check validity of Dmax in V ′
if Dmax /∈ Ol(V ′) or Dmax 6= max(Ol(V ′))
then
Increase ∆x˜l and skip rest of loop;
end
Regenerate V ′P from V ′ = {m′i,m′j ,m′x1,m′x2};
// Check similarity VP and VP ′
foreach m′i in V ′P do
Find closest mi in VP ;
Calculate distance di = d(mi,m′i);
Remove mi and m′i from VP and V ′P ;
end
// Update best guess
if
∑
di < emin then
Let emin =
∑
di, θmin = θ and
∆x˜min = ∆x˜l
end
end
end
3. Idem as Dmax, except: add ∆x˜min to entries
4. Idem as Dmax;
Return: V
